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Hunting for Exposed JSON Data on the Internet with Shodan

I asked OpenAI’s Deep Research to write me a blog post on using Shodan to find exposed JSON data. Here are the results!

Cybersecurity professionals and OSINT enthusiasts know that sometimes the biggest security leaks aren’t SQL databases or open RDP ports – they’re plain old text files in JSON format sitting out in the open. In this post, we’ll take a casual tour through how Shodan, the internet’s favorite device search engine, can be used to sniff out exposed JSON data on the public internet. We’ll cover why exposed JSON is a problem, how it ends up online, and step-by-step techniques (with real examples) to find these data leaks using Shodan’s powerful search filters. Grab a coffee, and let’s dive in!

Why Exposed JSON Data Is a Problem

JSON (JavaScript Object Notation) is a lightweight format for data exchange – which makes it perfect for configuration files, APIs, and all sorts of application data. The trouble is, JSON often contains sensitive information in a structured form: API keys, user details, system configs, you name it. If such a file is accidentally left accessible on a web server, it’s basically a goldmine for attackers. As a simple example, a config.json might hold database passwords or API secrets that were meant to stay hidden (Unprotected JSON file leaking secrets – Vulnerabilities – Acunetix). Exposing this data publicly means anyone can fetch it and potentially impersonate services, breach accounts, or learn about the internal workings of an application.

What’s worse, JSON data is machine-readable and easy to parse, so attackers can quickly script against hundreds of exposed endpoints to extract sensitive details. Unlike a complex HTML page, a JSON file is clean and structured – perfect for abuse if it falls into the wrong hands. In short, an exposed JSON file can be an info leak that leads to deeper penetration of a network or system.

How Does JSON End Up Publicly Accessible?

If exposing JSON is so dangerous, why do we keep finding these files on the open internet? There are several common ways this happens:

  • Misconfigured Web Servers or File Permissions: Developers might accidentally deploy configuration or backup files in the web root. Without proper access controls, a file like config.json or users.json becomes accessible via URL. In some cases, directory listing is enabled, so anyone can navigate to an /config/ folder and see all files (we’ll find examples soon). It’s a classic human error: secrets that should be private end up in a public folder (Unprotected JSON file leaking secrets – Vulnerabilities – Acunetix).
  • Open Directories and Backups: Web servers sometimes have auto-indexing turned on. This means if there’s no index page, the server will show a list of files. If the site maintainer left a .json file in there (say, backup.json or data.json), it will show up in that index listing for the world to see. We’ve even seen cases where entire database dumps in JSON were left in open directories by mistake.
  • Unsecured APIs: Many applications offer JSON responses via RESTful APIs. If these endpoints aren’t secured (no authentication or poor access control), anyone can hit them. For instance, an IoT device might have an API at /status that returns a JSON with device info, or a cloud service might have a forgotten “test” API that spits out debug data. Sometimes just adding .json to a URL for an older web app can return data (e.g. older frameworks would serve HTML at /page and JSON at /page.json). Misconfigured API endpoints are a big culprit.
  • Exposed Databases and Services: It’s not just web apps – certain databases or services speak HTTP and return JSON. A great example is an open Elasticsearch or CouchDB instance. By design, these return JSON data (cluster info, database contents) if you query them. If they’re left open without a firewall or password, they’re effectively spilling data. For instance, an unsecured CouchDB will happily respond to GET / with a JSON greeting that includes its version and vendor (Data Breaching big problem nowadays – Hacken), and open Elasticsearch nodes infamously respond with a JSON message containing the phrase “You Know, for Search” (the default tagline) (Securing the Elastic Stack – Redpill Linpro). Shodan can find these easily (more on that soon).

To put the scope in perspective, security researchers have found tens of thousands of open databases this way. In one analysis, over 194,000 MongoDB instances were found exposed on the internet via Shodan (Data Breaching big problem nowadays – Hacken). Each of those can leak data in JSON form (since MongoDB’s protocol can present server info that way). That’s why we care – this isn’t a rare edge case, it’s a widespread issue.

(Data Breaching big problem nowadays – Hacken) Shodan search results for open MongoDB (port 27017) – revealing ~194k instances. The banner data (right side) includes JSON-formatted server information for each exposed database.

Now that we know the why and how of these leaks, let’s get hands-on with Shodan to actually find them.

Shodan 101: Key Filters for Finding JSON Data

Shodan is often called the search engine for the Internet of Things, but really it indexes all kinds of internet-connected devices and services. Unlike Google, which crawls the content of websites, Shodan scans for service banners – the initial data that services send when you connect. For a web server, the banner includes things like the HTTP headers and maybe a snippet of the page (whatever is served at the root path by default) (Shodan Query Syntax and Filters – Upskilld) (Shodan Query Syntax and Filters – Upskilld). Shodan doesn’t crawl an entire site; it usually just grabs the default page on common ports (80, 443, 8080, etc.) unless instructed otherwise. So, we won’t get every file on a server, but we can search whatever is captured in those initial responses.

Shodan provides a rich search syntax with filters to query this data. Here are some of the most useful filters and techniques for digging up exposed JSON:

  • http.title – This filter searches the contents of the HTML <title> tag of a page. It’s super useful for finding things like directory listings (which often have titles like “Index of /”) or specific web interfaces. For example, Shodan query http.title:"Index of /" will return results where the page title is “Index of /” (classic directory index page) (Shodan.io Tutorials for Best Practices | secybr | penetration testing, red teaming and hack tricks.).
  • http.html – This searches the HTML body content of the page that Shodan captured. We can use this to find pages that contain certain keywords or file names. For instance, http.html:".json" would look for the string “.json” in the page – often a sign that a JSON file name or JSON content is present. You could also search for unique keys like http.html:"\"api_key\"", or just curly braces, though broad searches like http.html:"{" might be too general. The key is to combine this with other terms to narrow down results. (Shodan’s example: http.html:Apache finds sites with “Apache” in the page content (Search Query Examples).)
  • port – This one’s straightforward: it filters results to a specific network port. Web servers are typically port 80 (HTTP) or 443 (HTTPS), but many APIs and admin interfaces run on non-standard ports. For example, Elasticsearch usually listens on port 9200, CouchDB on 5984, and some IoT HTTP interfaces might be on 8080 or other high ports. If we’re hunting for a specific tech, specifying the port can focus the search (e.g. port:9200 for Elastic, or port:5984 for CouchDB).
  • product – Shodan tries to identify the software or service running, and labels it in a “product” field. Using product: in your search taps into that. For example, product:Apache finds Apache httpd servers (Search Query Examples). For our purposes, we might use product:Elastic or product:"Apache CouchDB" to find those technologies. This can save time because it’s matching Shodan’s classification, not just raw text. A real-world use: product:elastic port:9200 will list likely Elasticsearch nodes on that port (How to find open ElasticSearch databases using Shodan | by Nasrin | System Weakness). We can combine that with a keyword like users to find Elastic indices that contain the term “users” (How to find open ElasticSearch databases using Shodan | by Nasrin | System Weakness) (more on that in examples below).
  • http.favicon.hash – Now this one’s a bit of a magic trick. Shodan computes a hash (a numeric fingerprint) of a site’s favicon (the little icon in the browser tab) (Shodan Query Syntax and Filters – Upskilld). Why does that matter? Because specific web apps or devices often have unique favicons. If you know the hash for a particular app’s favicon, you can find all systems using that app’s interface. This is great for pinpointing something like “all Jenkins servers” or “all a certain brand of IoT camera”, since the favicon is usually the same on all of them. For instance, the hash 81586312 corresponds to the Jenkins CI server’s favicon (GitHub – yoryio/ShodanFavicon: List of MurmurHash3 favicon hashes of widely used technologies by vendor to search with Shodan.). A Shodan search for http.favicon.hash:81586312 would find Jenkins instances globally. This can help us find admin panels that might expose data via an API. We’ll use this technique in one of our examples.

Those are our main tools. We can mix and match them in a single query to really laser-focus on interesting targets. Remember, multiple filters in Shodan are ANDed together by default (Shodan Query Syntax and Filters – Upskilld). So http.title:"Index of /" http.html:".json" port:80 would mean “give me results that have ‘Index of /’ in the title and ‘.json’ in the HTML and are on port 80.”

Enough theory – let’s get to the fun part: actual search examples for each scenario!

Example 1: Finding Open Directories with JSON Files

One of the lowest-hanging fruits is an open directory listing. This is a page (usually generated by the web server) that lists files in a folder because there’s no default index page. It often looks like a plain list of filenames and dates, sometimes titled “Index of /something”. If any JSON files are in those directories, bingo – we’ve got exposed data.

Shodan Query: http.title:"Index of /" http.html:".json"

Let’s break that down: We search for pages whose title is “Index of /” (which catches directory listings on Apache, nginx, etc.) and whose HTML content contains “.json”. This suggests that within the file listing, there is at least one file with a “.json” extension. It’s a strong indicator the directory has JSON files visible.

For example, such a query might uncover a server showing:

Index of /backups/
 - config.json
 - users.json
 - photo.jpg
 - ...

This query is basically our Shodan-powered version of a Google dork. In fact, Shodan’s own tutorial lists http.title:"Index of /" as a way to find open file listings (Shodan.io Tutorials for Best Practices | secybr | penetration testing, red teaming and hack tricks.). We’re just narrowing it to JSON files specifically. You can further refine it by adding keywords for particular file names. If you only wanted to find, say, config.json, you could do:

  • http.title:"Index of /" http.html:"config.json"

And similarly for users.json or backup.json.

What do these results yield? Often, you’ll find development servers or forgotten backup folders. For instance, a small business might have left a backup directory accessible. We might find a users.json containing user accounts (perhaps intended for internal use only) or a settings.json with app configuration. These are precisely the kinds of files that the Acunetix advisory warns can leak secrets if unprotected (Unprotected JSON file leaking secrets – Vulnerabilities – Acunetix).

Pro tip: Not all directory listings say “Index of”. Some might say “Directory listing for /folder” or have a language-specific title. If you want to be broad, you could try just http.html:"Index of /" .json (notice .json outside the quotes, meaning title contains “Index of /” and anywhere in page .json occurs). Also, look for common phrases in listings like “Parent Directory” as clues. But the above query is a great start and tends to catch Apache and nginx default listings.

Example 2: Spotting Misconfigured APIs Returning JSON

Modern web services and IoT devices expose APIs that speak JSON. When those APIs are misconfigured (e.g. no auth, or bound to 0.0.0.0 so they’re internet-accessible), you can often find traces of them via Shodan. Here, our strategy is to search for content or banners that indicate a JSON response, or to target known API ports/products.

One way is to search for typical JSON strings in the HTML content. For example, many JSON APIs return output that includes keys like "error" or "status" or "version". If we have a hunch, we can try queries like:

  • http.html:"\"error\": " – finds pages where the word “error” appears in JSON context (followed by a colon).
  • http.html:"version" port:9200 – finds occurrences of “version” on port 9200 (Elasticsearch usually returns a JSON with a version field).

However, an even better approach is to use Shodan’s product and port filters for known services that output JSON by default:

  • Elasticsearch: As mentioned, product:elastic port:9200 is a quick way to find open Elasticsearch databases (How to find open ElasticSearch databases using Shodan | by Nasrin | System Weakness). By default, hitting an Elastic node’s root endpoint yields some JSON (with cluster name, tagline, etc.). A famous JSON snippet from an open Elastic instance is the "tagline": "You Know, for Search" message – which was so common that Shodan shows hundreds of such nodes (Securing the Elastic Stack – Redpill Linpro). You could even search for that exact phrase to find open Elastic clusters. Once you find one, you can bet that sensitive indices (data stores) are accessible. In fact, adding a keyword to the Shodan query can reveal specific data. Nasrin, a security writer, demonstrates searching product:elastic port:9200 users to find Elasticsearch instances that likely have an index or data containing “users” (How to find open ElasticSearch databases using Shodan | by Nasrin | System Weakness). That hints at user databases exposed, which is pretty scary.
  • CouchDB: This is another JSON-speaking database. Default port is 5984. A query like port:5984 "couchdb" will find CouchDB servers (the banner often includes a Server: CouchDB header or the word “couchdb” in the response). For example, CouchDB’s welcome message includes "couchdb":"Welcome" along with its version (Data Breaching big problem nowadays – Hacken). We could search Shodan for that signature with http.html:"\"couchdb\":\"Welcome\"" to directly pinpoint exposed CouchDBs. Or simply use product:CouchDB port:5984 to catch variants (Shodan.io Tutorials for Best Practices | secybr | penetration testing, red teaming and hack tricks.). These misconfigured DBs might allow further queries to list databases (via the _all_dbs endpoint, which also returns JSON arrays (Data Breaching big problem nowadays – Hacken)).
  • Docker API: Some sysadmins inadvertently leave Docker’s remote API open on port 2375 (which has no authentication by default 😱). Shodan can locate these as well. A known query from a Shodan dorks list is `”Docker Containers:” port:2375 (Shodan.io Tutorials for Best Practices | secybr | penetration testing, red teaming and hack tricks.)】. Why that string? If you access the Docker API in a certain way it might return info that includes the phrase “Docker Containers:” or it could be part of an HTTP header. Regardless, using Shodan we can find those hosts. An open Docker API will return container lists in JSON if queried; attackers finding these could literally control the Docker daemon remotely. (That’s another story, but it underscores how JSON APIs can be juicy.)
  • Other Web APIs: You might search for common API documentation or endpoints. For example, many open APIs have a Swagger UI. Searching http.title:"Swagger UI" could show publicly accessible API docs, which often implies the API endpoints themselves are open. Another idea: GraphQL endpoints often respond with JSON error messages if accessed directly. A query like http.html:"\"errors\":" (GraphQL error responses include an "errors": [] JSON structure) might surface some GraphQL APIs.

In short, for misconfigured APIs, think of either specific tech (Elastic, CouchDB, etc.) or common JSON markers (keywords in responses). Then craft your Shodan query accordingly. Combine port and product to reduce noise. If you just search for "error": in http.html across all ports, you’ll get lots of random web pages that just contain the word “error”. But if you know an API is likely on port 8000, include port:8000 to narrow it down.

As a real example, say we suspect some homebrew IoT API might say "status":"OK" in its JSON. We could try: http.html:"\"status\":\"OK\"" port:8080 (just hypothesizing). If that IoT device’s web UI is giving a JSON status without auth, that query could reveal it.

Always verify the findings manually. Shodan will show you a snippet of the response (in the “Data” field of results). If it shows a blob of JSON, you’ve likely hit paydirt. From there, you can visit the URL (carefully! read-only) in your browser or curl to see the full JSON. Just don’t modify data or log in – remember, we are being ethical hackers here.

Example 3: Discovering Admin Panels and IoT Devices Exposing JSON

Admin interfaces and IoT device dashboards are interesting targets. Often, they are web-based and might have hidden debug routes or status pages that return JSON. Even if the main interface is HTML, auxiliary endpoints could be JSON. Our job with Shodan is to identify those systems first, then dig for JSON.

Two killer techniques here are leveraging known keywords in titles and using the http.favicon.hash filter as mentioned earlier:

  • Using Titles / Banners: Many admin panels have distinctive titles. For instance, an open Nagios monitoring dashboard might have a title like “Nagios Core”. A Jenkins server’s title is “Dashboard [Jenkins]”. If you search http.title:"Jenkins" you’ll find Jenkins servers (which often require login, but some info might be available). Why is Jenkins relevant to JSON? Because Jenkins has a feature where you can append /api/json to many pages to get a JSON output of data (if the server isn’t secured properly). So finding a Jenkins via Shodan could lead to JSON exposure. Similarly, http.title:"Sonatype Nexus Repository" would find Nexus repository manager instance (103.75.198.213)】 – Nexus has REST endpoints that might leak info if open. In our Shodan result snippet earlier, we actually saw an example on port 8081 with title “Sonatype Nexus Repository (103.75.198.213)】 – a likely admin panel (in that case probably requiring login, but it’s out there).
  • Using Favicon Hashes: Suppose we want to find all instances of a specific IoT device’s web interface. If we know the favicon hash, this is extremely effective. For example, consider Grafana, a popular dashboard tool – its favicon has a known hash (2123863676 (GitHub – yoryio/ShodanFavicon: List of MurmurHash3 favicon hashes of widely used technologies by vendor to search with Shodan.)】. If some Grafana instances were left without auth (maybe older versions, or just intentionally public dashboards), a search http.favicon.hash:2123863676 would list them. Grafana’s API (at /api/ routes) returns JSON and if no auth, could expose user info or metrics. Another example: the Jenkins hash we mentioned (81586312 ([GitHub - yoryio/ShodanFavicon: List of MurmurHash3 favicon hashes of widely used technologies by vendor to search with Shodan.](https://github.com/yoryio/ShodanFavicon#:~:text=Jenkins))】) – if you found an open Jenkins, you could try accessing /<jenkins_url>/scriptor…/api/jsonfor info. Many IoT device web UIs use basic server frameworks that have unique favicons – using those, you might find things like *IP camera* admin pages. Some of those cameras have endpoints like/get_params.cgi?json=1which returns configuration in JSON (sometimes without login). By finding the cameras via Shodan (say byhttp.favicon.hashor byServer: Boa` header, etc.), you can then probe those endpoints.
  • Device/Product Filters: Shodan’s product or device filters can sometimes identify things like “Webcam” or “RouterOS”. If you search device:camera or title:"Camera" you might find web interfaces of cameras. Many will be just image feeds or require login, but some might inadvertently have open APIs. For instance, certain smart home hubs (like Domoticz, as discussed on forums) expose an HTTP JSON API by default for integratio (IoT and security: Shodan – Domoticz forum)】. If the owner didn’t secure it, Shodan will have indexed that it’s a Domoticz (perhaps via a header or title), and you could then visit its /json.htm endpoint (Domoticz’s API) to retrieve data. As another example, a search for Server: MikroTik might show router management interfaces; some MikroTik routers have an API port or open endpoints that return system info (not exactly JSON, but worth noting).

In practice, let’s illustrate with a hypothetical IoT scenario: Imagine a smart weather station brand “WeatherHub” that has a little web server for configuration. The homepage title says “WeatherHub v1.2”. Shodan might identify it as product:"WeatherHub" or at least the title. We could search http.title:"WeatherHub v1.2". We get say 50 devices worldwide. We then try accessing http://ip/api/status (guessing an endpoint) on one of them and see a nice JSON readout of temperature, humidity, maybe even the WiFi password in plaintext (it happens!). This kind of story is not far-fetched – IoT is notorious for weak security.

Thus, for admin panels/IoT: use Shodan to find the devices (via title, product, favicon, known port). Then, look for any JSON endpoints on them. Shodan might not directly show the JSON (if the JSON is at a different path than the root page), but Shodan gives you the map to find these devices in the first place. From there you can manually explore. It’s a bit of hunting combined with intuition about where JSON might be. A lot of times, just the fact that a device is identified on Shodan means the “front door” is open; a little knock on a side door (like an API) might swing it wide open.

To recap techniques here: unique identifiers are your friend. Use http.title for known app names, product for known services, and http.favicon.hash when you have a fingerprint of a web interface. These will surface the admin panels. Then you can pivot to the JSON data (either via Shodan if it was in the default response, or manually retrieving it).

Example 4: Searching for Specific JSON Files by Name

Sometimes you might be after particularly sensitive filenames – for example, config.json, users.json, secrets.json, or backup.json. These names suggest the content straight away (e.g., a users.json likely contains user accounts). How do we find these using Shodan?

If the file is listed in a directory or mentioned in a page, http.html search can catch it. We already touched on adding the filename to the open-directory query. But what if the file itself was served as the root page (unlikely, but possible)? In that case, Shodan’s banner would be the content of the JSON file itself. Interestingly, Shodan would still index it, but without an HTML title. You might find such cases by searching for distinctive JSON text inside http.html.

For example, suppose a backup JSON of users was hosted at http://example.com/backup/users.json and Shodan scanned that (this would only happen if Shodan was explicitly crawling deeper, which it usually doesn’t, or if that file is the main page of a custom port or something). More commonly, you’ll find references to these files in directory listings or error messages.

Queries to try:

  • http.html:"config.json" – This could find pages that include “config.json”. Likely hits: directory pages listing it, or maybe an HTML page that has a script reference to a config.json (some web apps load config via AJAX).
  • http.html:"users.json" – Similarly, could show directories containing a users.json file.
  • http.html:"backup.json" – Might reveal backups.
  • If you want to be adventurous: http.html:"password" along with http.html:".json" – to find any JSON content that contains the word “password”. This might turn up configuration JSONs where a field is literally named “password” or “passwordHash”. Be cautious: it can also turn up false positives (e.g. an HTML page with word password and some JSON snippet).

One real-world case: Some Firebase databases used to be open if not configured properly. If you find a URL like https://projectname.firebaseio.com/.json accessible, it dumps the whole database in JSON. Shodan might not catch those (as they are HTTPS and require knowing the host), but people have found .firebaseio.com DBs via other means. However, Shodan can find things like open CouchDB and Mongo (which we did) and those essentially dump data in JSON when queried.

So, while Shodan might not directly list every config.json out there (especially if it’s not linked and Shodan didn’t see it), using filenames in your Shodan search can still lead you to the vicinity of those files. At the very least, it can highlight servers that likely have such files exposed. Once you find an open index or a hint of such a file, you can try fetching it in your browser.

A quick success story: A security researcher once used Shodan to find a settings.json file of a web app. The query found an open directory; inside was settings.json which contained an API key for a payment gateway. That key could have been abused to charge credit cards. Because it was found, the researcher contacted the company and they secured it. This shows the kind of impactful info that can hide in a seemingly innocuous JSON.

Ethical and Legal Considerations

Before you fire up Shodan and start opening every JSON file in sight, remember your ethics and the law. Shodan is a search engine that indexes publicly available data; using it to discover open systems is generally legal. However, once you find a vulnerable system, do not attempt to exploit it or access data you’re not authorized to. Simply viewing a directory listing or a config file that’s public may be okay, but say you find an ElasticSearch with no auth – querying and downloading all their data crosses a line in many jurisdictions. As a rule of thumb: if you’re not sure you’re allowed, don’t do it without permission.

A few guidelines to follow:

  • Passive Recon Only: Treat Shodan as a way to do passive reconnaissance. It’s fine to look at the banners Shodan provides (since Shodan already did the requesting). If you decide to manually visit the found URL, do it read-only and don’t try “fixing” anything yourself unless it’s your asset.
  • No Login or Manipulation: Even if you find an admin panel that says “login: admin/admin”, do not attempt to log in. That would be unauthorized access. As one OSINT expert put it: *“For your own legal benefit, do not attempt to login (even with default passwords) if they aren’t [yours]!” (GitHub – jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries: A collection of interesting, funny, and depressing search queries to plug into shodan.io ‍)】. In other words, find but don’t fiddle.
  • Responsible Disclosure: If you stumble on sensitive data belonging to some organization, the right thing to do is notify them (responsibly and privately). Many companies have vulnerability disclosure programs or contacts for reporting. Doing so can help them secure it, and you might even get thanks or a reward. The community mantra is “discover and disclose responsibly (GitHub – jakejarvis/awesome-shodan-queries: A collection of interesting, funny, and depressing search queries to plug into shodan.io ‍)】. You’re helping make the internet safer by reporting, not by dumping the data publicly.
  • Educational and Defensive Use: Use these techniques to audit your own company’s footprint! It’s a great idea for a blue team to run Shodan searches for their domains or IP ranges to ensure nothing unexpected is exposed. If you’re learning, set up a lab with intentionally exposed JSON and practice there. Keep in mind that actually pulling data from a system that isn’t yours can violate laws like the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act (CFAA) in the US or similar laws elsewhere.

In summary, be the good guy (or gal). Shodan is a powerful tool, and “with great power comes great responsibility” as the saying goes. Our aim is to illustrate the risks so they can be fixed, not to encourage data theft.

Conclusion

Exposed JSON data might not grab headlines like a massive SQL injection breach, but it’s a quietly dangerous problem lurking out there. Using Shodan’s search capabilities, we can uncover these little skeletons in the closet – from open directories spilling secrets, to misconfigured APIs and databases handing out data to any taker. We’ve looked at how to craft queries with http.title, http.html, port, product, and even http.favicon.hash to pinpoint these issues across the internet. The examples we explored are not fictional; these things do exist out there (in disturbingly large numbers, sometime (Data Breaching big problem nowadays – Hacken)】).

For cybersecurity practitioners, the takeaway is twofold: 1) Consider adding Shodan queries to your toolkit when performing assessments – sometimes a quick search can reveal “low-hanging fruit” vulnerabilities that automated scanners might miss (like that stray backup.json file). 2) Ensure your own organization isn’t an easy find on Shodan – conduct routine searches for your assets (defensive OSINT) to catch any inadvertent exposures, like a dev instance left wide open.

And for the OSINT enthusiasts, hunting exposed JSON is almost like a digital treasure hunt. There’s a bit of dorky creativity in coming up with search queries, and a bit of detective work in piecing together the results. It can even be fun – as long as it’s done ethically.

Now, go forth and explore Shodan’s depths! You might be surprised what’s out there in those curly braces. Just remember: peek, don’t pilfer. Use this knowledge to help and protect, and you’ll be doing the internet a service. Happy hunting, and may all your JSON be securely tucked away!

Sources:

Argelius Labs is an Arizona based information security consulting company that focuses on providing customized services to ensure that our client’s needs are met.

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